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Abstract: In my “Deep Inconsistency” (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2002),
I compared my meaning–inconsistency view on the liar with Graham Priest’s di-
aletheist view, using my view to help cast doubt on Priest’s arguments for his view.
Jc Beall and Priest have recently published a reply to my article (Australasian Jour-
nal of Logic, 2007). I here respond to their criticisms. In addition, I compare the
meaning–inconsistency view with Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap’s revision theory
of truth, and discuss how best to deal with the strengthened liar.
1 
In my ‘Deep Inconsistency’ (2002a) (henceforth ), I criticized Graham
Priest’s dialetheism by unfavorably comparing it to my preferred view on the
liar paradox, a view I will here call the meaning–inconsistency view. Perhaps
the main claim in Jc Beall and Priest’s reply (henceforth &)1 is that I am
guilty of an ignoratio: in , I argue that Priest (1987) fails to establish the an-
alyticity of certain principles, but, & say, Priest (1987) isn’t concerned to
argue for the analyticity of these principles. Among other criticisms & level
against  can be mentioned especially the following: (i) Since I do not in fact
defend a particular theory of truth I am ‘out of the game’, not really partic-
ipating in the debate which others participate in; (ii) I lack—for principled
reasons—an account of in virtue of what principles are meaning–constitutive.
Here is what I will do in this reply. First I will briefly rehearse the main
elements of both my own view and the criticisms of dialetheism raised in .
Then I will respond to the charges listed from &. Lastly I will make some
remarks on the strengthened liar.
1Published in Australasian Journal of Logic (2007); http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.
au/ajl/2007/.
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2  – 
Let a meaning–constitutive principle (henceforth, an mc) be—roughly; some
needed clarification will be provided below2—a principle such that it is part
of competence with the expressions involved to be disposed to accept it. On
my view, some mcs are not true, hence not analytically true. Specifically, this
is shown by some paradoxes. Both the liar and the sorites paradoxes arise be-
cause there are mcs which jointly lead to contradiction, and hence cannot all
be true. As I put it in , these paradoxes show our language to be deeply
inconsistent. (Another label, perhaps a better one, suggested by Brian Weath-
erson in his weblog, may be ‘meaning–inconsistency’.) Somewhat simplifiedly
and somewhat metaphorically we may put the matter as follows. To employ an
expression with a certain meaning is to, so to speak, take on certain semantic
obligations: to use the expression in accordance with the rules for its use, the
mcs. But what can happen is that the obligations taken on are inconsistent:
there is nothing a speaker can do to fulfill all her obligations. Compare, per-
haps, someone who has taken on inconsistent moral obligations—having made
promises she cannot possibly jointly keep. (The talk of ‘rules’ must be taken
with a grain of salt. In my view, talk of mcs should replace talk of rules.) On
views of meaning which accord pride of place to something analogous to mcs—
this is, more or less, all views according to which meaning is conceptual–role—
there is a separate question of what the truth conditions of sentences are and
what the semantic values of subsentential expressions—their contributions to
truth conditions—are. The standard answer is that the semantic values are
such as to make true the principles that are part of conceptual role. If, like me,
one allows that mcs may fail to be true, one cannot give this standard answer
unmodified. What I say instead is: the semantic values are such as to make the
mcs, taken jointly, as close to true as possible (given other constraints).3
The idea is helpfully explained by considering the traditional notion of an-
alyticity. As theorists like Paul Boghossian (e.g. 1996) and Jamie Tappenden
(e.g. 1993) have stressed, there are several distinct ideas underlying the tradi-
tional notion of analyticity. One is the metaphysical idea of truth in virtue of
meaning. The other concerns what it is part of semantic competence to be dis-
posed to accept. Once these ideas are properly distinguished, the suggestion
that some sentences can have the second property without having the first—
and without even being true—is fairly natural. It is the latter property I call
meaning–constitutivity (with the proviso that more care is required in a fully
2And in my (2007) there is a more comprehensive discussion of the issue.
3& complain (p. 75fn2) about the label ‘deep inconsistency’, saying that the inconsistency
in question ‘is of only a relatively superficial kind’. There isn’t much point to quarreling over
labels. But just to explain the use of the label: the reason the inconsistency is deep is that on
this view, when the language is inconsistent, there is nothing a speaker can do to satisfy all her
semantic obligations. By contrast, on the inconsistency view of a typical dialetheist, a speaker
can satisfy all her semantic obligations: it is just the obligations are different from what they are
often taken to be.
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accurate statement); I will reserve the label analyticity for the former prop-
erty. Analyticity then implies truth, while it is a central claim of the meaning–
inconsistency view that meaning–constitutivity doesn’t.
3     
To further explain what the meaning–inconsistency view does and does not in-
volve, it may help to compare it with Gupta and Belnap’s (1993) revision theory
of truth.
On Gupta and Belnap’s theory, a sentence S is definitionally equivalent to ‘S
is true’, but the two are not always materially equivalent. It may then sound as
if Gupta and Belnap defend a theory not too different from the one I defend.
That is, it may sound as if their claim of definitional equivalence amounts to
saying that it is meaning–constitutive for ‘true’ that “s’ is true’ and ‘s’ are mate-
rially equivalent, even when “s’ is true’ and ‘s’ are not actually materially equiva-
lent. However, there are fundamental differences between Gupta and Belnap’s
revision theory and the meaning–inconsistency view, and it may be instructive
to see what they are.
Consider an example Gupta and Belnap use to illustrate their theory: the
predicate G, introduced by the following definition.
(1) x is G =def x is F or x is both H and non–G.
We are attempting to define the concept G, and G itself occurs in the
definiens so this is a circular definition. But the definition is non–trivial. In
fact, so long as there are no non–Fs which are H, nothing untoward happens at
all. If a is an F, then it follows immediately from the definition that it is G. If
a is a non–F and a non–H then it follows that a is non–G. But suppose that a is
non–F and H. Then it would appear that by familiar reasoning we can derive a
contradiction. Suppose a is G. We can infer the definiens from the definien-
dum, and since a is by assumption G and a fails to be F, a is H and non–G. So a
is non–G, which contradicts the assumption we began with. So a is non–G. But
then a is H and non–G and by the definition, a is G. So a is both G and non–G.
Contradiction!
But Gupta and Belnap hold that while ordinarily, definitions like (1) are held
to amount to
(2) x is G if and only if x is F or x is both H and non–G,
we should not conceive of definitional identities like (1) as biconditionals but
instead as rules licensing the move from the left hand side to the right hand
side and vice versa.
The idea is this. Suppose that we come to (1) with the hypothesis that
nothing is G. Then a will by assumption be both H and non–G. Then (1)
licenses us instead to conclude that a is G. This is not to be conceived of as a
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contradiction but as a revision. And if we come to (1) with the hypothesis that
a is G, then since a is not F, a is H and non–G; so a non–G after all.
Similarly for the liar. Gupta and Belnap say that when we reason our way to
a contradiction, that is because we have mistakenly taken definitional equiva-
lence to entail material equivalence.
Now, the difference between the revision theory as Gupta and Belnap de-
fend it and the meaning–inconsistency view is the following. There is nothing
in the revision theory which entails that the language used is in any way amiss.
The revision theorist can say that the reasoning to a contradiction does not
proceed in accordance with what is constitutive of the meanings of the expres-
sions of the language. But the meaning–inconsistency theorist’s characteristic
claim is that the reasoning does so proceed.
I can explain the point in terms of semantic obligations. It is a defining
feature of the meaning–inconsistency view that fully competent speakers of
natural language take on semantic obligations that cannot be jointly fulfilled.
But it is fully compatible with the revision theory that fully competent speak-
ers can fulfill all their semantic obligations: for their semantic obligations need
only include accepting that a sentence S is definitionally equivalent to a sen-
tence predicating truth of S; not that these sentences are materially equivalent.
(One can presumably combine a revision theory with a meaning–inconsistency
view. It may for instance be reasonable to see Herzberger’s (1982) view as such
a combination. My point is just that the revision theory need not be under-
stood as a meaning–inconsistency view, and isn’t best seen as such on its most
influential elaboration. Neither need the meaning–inconsistency theorist be a
revision theorist. Even if the ideas can be conjoined, they are different.)
4      
Now compare the meaning–inconsistency view with dialetheism; specifically,
the dialetheist claim that the proper response to the liar paradox is to accept
that there are true contradictions. There are superficial similarities between
what I say and what the dialetheist says. The dialetheist too accepts that there
is a sense in which our language is inconsistent: it is inconsistent in that some
contradictions come out true in it. (In  I call this Priest–inconsistency.) But
the similarities are only superficial. One can hold that the paradoxes show that
our language is meaning–inconsistent without taking them to show that our
language is Priest–inconsistent. That would be my view. Or one can hold that
the paradoxes show that our language is Priest–inconsistent without taking
them to show that our language is meaning–inconsistent. That, I took it in ,
is Priest’s view. & confirms that impression.
I have argued for the meaning–inconsistency view in a number of papers.4
In , I more or less only summarized it. The aim of  was to compare
4See primarily my 2002a.
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the meaning–inconsistency view with the Priest–inconsistency view. The main
points were two. First, I argued that Priest’s argument from the liar para-
dox to dialetheism does not favor a Priest–inconsistency view over a meaning–
inconsistency view. Second, I argued that once it is plain what sorts of consid-
erations would argue for a Priest–inconsistency view over a meaning–
inconsistency view, one should start questioning the significance of the Priest–
inconsistency, even if Priest–inconsistency does obtain.
In brief, my first, and main, argument was this. Take any standard formu-
lation of the liar reasoning. Let the suspects be the assumptions relied on in
this reasoning which could prima facie reasonably be singled out as what we
should not have accepted in the first place. Standardly, theorists who seek to
solve the liar seek to show one of these suspects to be the real culprit. Priest,
by contrast, seeks to defend each of the suspects, and on this basis argues that
we should accept the contradictory conclusion of the liar reasoning. What I
argue is that the suspects are all mcs or immediate consequences of mcs. In
holding this, I disagree with orthodox theorists who hold that at least one of
the suspects isn’t an mc. But I also have a disagreement with Priest. For if
meaning–constitutivity doesn’t entail analytic truth, then all the suspects can
be mcs while still the liar reasoning isn’t sound. For it may be that the law of
non–contradiction () is also an mc, so that no matter whether we accept
the liar reasoning as sound or we reject one of the underlying assumptions, we
end up rejecting one of the mcs. (One complication, which I mention already
in , is that the dialetheist can accept the  in the sense of holding that all
its instances are true. It is just that the dialetheist will add that some instances
are also false. In order for dialetheism to involve a violation of the relevant mc,
the mc must be not only that all instances of the  are true, but that they
are only true. There are complications here. But since & do not pause on
these complications, I won’t either.)
5   &’ 
Let me now turn to &’s criticisms. As mentioned, their main point is that 
is guilty of an ignoratio (pp. 77–78). In , I argue that Priest does not manage
to show that the assumptions in the liar paradox which jointly entail a contra-
diction are analytically true; but, & respond, analyticity is beside the point
anyway for all that the argument demands is that the assumptions in question
are true.
Of course & are right that mere truth is sufficient. But they miss the
important point. The arguments Priest (1987) gives for taking the relevant as-
sumptions to be true are arguments of the sort traditionally used to establish
analytic truth—for example about the point of a given concept—and then it
is relevant that given the distinction between meaning–constitutivity and ana-
lytic truth, they establish only meaning–constitutivity. In fact, I needn’t have
used the notion of analyticity in stating the argument: I could have said sim-
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ply that the arguments of Priest’s that aim to establish truth at best establish
meaning–constitutivity.
Having dismissed &’s charge that I am guilty of an ignoratio, let me now
turn to the other major criticisms.
(i) One charge is that since I defend no particular theory of truth, I am ‘out
of the game’ (p. 79). &’s making this charge depends on an unwillingness
even to engage with what was one main theme in . What I argue concerning
the liar paradox is that it arises because of the meaning–inconsistency of our
language. To say this is not to subscribe to any particular theory of truth along-
side dialetheism, the revision theory, fixed–point theories, etc.: any particu-
lar claim about the semantic values of the liar sentence and related sentences.
Elsewhere—Eklund (manuscript)—I use the following terminology: what I of-
fer is a philosophy of the liar—a general account of why the liar paradox arises—
but I do not thereby immediately take a stand on which theory of the liar—
which view on the semantic values of the terms and sentences concerned—is
right.
One argument of mine—the argument that & say commits an ignora-
tio—is that Priest’s argument from the liar paradox to dialetheism does not
decide between his theory of the liar and my philosophy, which is in itself neu-
tral among all the theories in the running. I note in  that Priest can offer
other arguments for why one should indeed take the dialetheist route. He
can argue either that there is no mc which militates against dialetheism—so
there is no reason to take our language to be meaning–inconsistent—or he can
argue that even if our language is meaning–inconsistent, a dialetheic, paracon-
sistent assignment of semantic values is what comes closest to satisfying the
mcs. This much I explicitly acknowledge in , and I also outline how such
arguments might go. Now, although I do say quite a bit more than & give
me credit for—oddly, they seem to overlook section IV—I can understand it if
they regard me as too dismissive. If my aim were to conclusively demonstrate
that Priest–inconsistency is not an option, then surely I say too little. But a
large part of my aim in  was to argue that whereas Priest wants dialetheism
to be a deep truth, something which is inescapable because of basic features
of thought, the considerations which would be relevant to show that Priest–
inconsistency, rather than mere meaning–inconsistency, obtains will have to
turn on rather specific features of our language or conceptual scheme. (Com-
pare here, by contrast, the rhetoric of e.g. Priest (1995a): true contradictions
are the inevitable result of running up against the limits of thought.)5
5& seem to have misunderstood the structure of  in various ways. For example, they
say, ‘In section 5 of the paper, Eklund points out that the distinction (between analyticity and
meaning–constitutivity) cannot be maintained against what he calls a response–dependent ac-
count of meaning, in which the truth of certain sentences just is constituted by our dispositions
to accept them’ (p. 75). Section 5 is in deed about response–dependence, but the point of the
section is not even nearly what & say it is. The points that section 5 is concerned to make
are: (i) a little discussed argument for dialetheism (and an argument that seems well as strong
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So to make explicit my response to &’s charge that I am ‘out of the
game’: They are right that there is a particular debate on the liar—indeed,
the most central debate—where I do not explicitly have a stand. I do not
have, in the terminology earlier introduced, a positive theory of the liar. But
of course that does not mean that I do not take a stand on any important
issues: I have a philosophy of the liar. The relation to Priest’s dialetheism is
that the availability of the philosophy of the liar that I defend problematizes
his argument for his favored theory.
(ii) & claim that there is a serious lacuna in my account since I lack an
explanation of what renders principles meaning–constitutive. & present a
supposed dilemma here. They say:
Call a disposition constitutive of competence an sc–disposition. The
crucial question concerns what accounts for these. Is it the case
that:
1. a speaker possesses sc–dispositions in virtue of a prior grasp of
the facts of meaning?
Or is it the case that:
2. a speaker’s possession of sc–dispositions is simply a brute fact of
semantic competence? (p. 75)
As & rightly stress, I cannot very well give the first answer. So all hinges
on whether the second option is workable. When it comes to the second op-
tion, & present the following argument:
But if we cannot appeal to an independent grasp of meanings, we
have a clear problem: How are sc–dispositions to be distinguished
from dispositions that hold in virtue of mere belief. People, after
all, are disposed to accept many claims that would seem to have lit-
tle to do with semantic competence. Consider the disposition to
accept that the world is older than 1 minute. All competent speak-
ers of the language barring some malfunction that hinders com-
petency have that disposition. Why is that not an sc–disposition?
There would seem to be no principled reason for claiming that it
is not. (p. 76)
I find the dialectic a bit curious. For what & here present is an argu-
ment against any conceptual–role or inferential–role semantics—not just a ver-
sion of conceptual–role semantics which aims to leave room for meaning–
inconsistency—and surely they must recognize that they cannot this simply
as those that have been more widely discussed) proceeds via appeal to response–dependence;
but (ii) the proper response to this argument is analogous to the response that I provide to
the dialetheist’s argument from the liar paradox. (I also think that the distinction between
analyticity and meaning–constitutivity would only be in tension with an unnecessarily naive
response–dependence account. But let me not get into that here.)
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dispose of that whole tradition. There are many things that a defender of
conceptual–role semantics can say; and I do not see that the specific fea-
tures of my view bars me from taking over any of these responses. For exam-
ple, a conceptual–role semanticist can, following Christopher Peacocke (1992),
say that those inferences which a thinker finds ‘primitively compelling’ are
meaning–constitutive, where for an inference to be primitively compelling for
a thinker is, roughly, for the thinker to find it compelling and to regard it as
not standing in need, even in principle, of further justification.6 This promises
to distinguish what is genuinely meaning–constitutive from examples like that
& provide. And it does not rule out a meaning–inconsistency view, since the
principles that lead to trouble in the case of the liar can all be primitively com-
pelling despite the fact that they lead to absurdity. (To stress, I do not mean to
subscribe to Peacocke’s view. I use it only as a ‘model’.)7
In an accompanying footnote, & go on to say that ‘if there’s no prin-
cipled way to distinguish sc–dispositions, then, since all people have differ-
ent dispositions to assert, it follows that all people speak different languages’
(p. 76fn3). I have already dismissed the antecedent of this claim. But a version
of their worry may still remain: if different speakers find different inferences
primitively compelling, different speakers will speak different languages. But
the conceptual role theorist has the tools to deal with this. She can appeal to
a distinction between expressions we are fully competent with and those ex-
pressions which we use with their customary meanings only because of how
we defer to other speakers. I did not go into these problems in the relevant
papers of mine because the problems arise equally for all theories which are,
broadly speaking, conceptual–role theories. There are further peculiarities in
the relevant part of &’s discussion. With no textual support whatever, they
ascribe to me a behaviorist view. And they present a compositionality worry
which, whether serious or not, arises equally for all versions of conceptual–role
semantics.
There are, to state the obvious, objections one may have to the specific
view I hold. And there are also important criticisms of conceptual role theories
generally. It would be silly not to take such criticisms seriously. All I want to
stress here is that the relevant criticisms in & are criticisms that, insofar as
they are worth taking seriously at all, are criticisms relevant to all conceptual–
role theories; and moreover that there are known responses to these criticisms
in the literature. It is not obvious that the responses work. But & do nothing
to advance the case against conceptual–role theories.
6See Peacocke (1992).
7For further discussion of the meaning–inconsistency view and semantic competence, see
my (2007).
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6   
& point to the strengthened liar as providing a reason to favor a dialetheist
theory over a non–dialetheist theory (p. 79). This is indeed a matter it would
have been nice to have explicitly discussed in , both because Priest has often
pointed to the strengthened liar as providing an argument for his dialetheist
view and I should have countered this specific argument, and, more impor-
tantly, because attention to the strengthened liar positively helps my case. The
meaning–inconsistency view helps diagnose what strengthened liar problems
are all about.
A strengthened liar problem (or revenge problem) for a given solution to the
liar paradox is, roughly, a liar–like problem that arises for the solution when
we focus on a new liar–like sentence formulated using the apparatus of the
purported solution. One common response to these problems is to insist that
properties expressed by the technical terms used in stating the given solution
can be expressed only in a richer metalanguage.
What Priest argues is that all non–dialetheist solutions face strengthened
liar problems, but a dialetheist account can avoid these problems and accord-
ingly is preferable. There are a number of ways for a non–dialetheist to attempt
to respond to Priest’s argument. One is to insist that a given non–dialetheist
account does not in fact face a strengthened liar problem. A second is to in-
sist that the dialetheist too faces problems as serious as the strengthened liar
problem. For example, what can the dialetheist say about a liar sentence that
says of itself that it is only untrue? (See e.g. Terence Parsons (1990) and Priest
(1995a) for discussion.) Thirdly, one can problematize the issue of exactly what
is the problem with strengthened liars and with being committed to saying
that certain properties aren’t expressible in our actual language. (For further
discussion of these issues, see further Eklund (2008).) It is the third line of ar-
gument I want to focus on here. Consider a theory of truth—call it T—which
is committed to saying that a given property P isn’t expressible in our actual
language. Why exactly would T ’s saying this amount to an embarrassment?
Here are some possible claims that may be made.
(a) Natural language is universal. So all properties are expressible in our
natural language. Hence, T must be false.
(b) T is itself formulated in our actual language and the formulation of T
involves an expression which expresses P. Then T is self–defeating.
(c) Property P is obviously expressible in natural language, so any theory
which denies that it is falls on its own absurdity.
I think we have little reason to believe that natural language is universal, so
if a theory like T faces problems, that must be because of (b) or (c). (Again see
further my (2008).)
Matti Eklund, “Reply to Beall and Priest”, Australasian Journal of Logic (6) 2008, 94–106
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008 103
With this as background, let me turn to the consequences of the meaning–
inconsistency view for how to think about strengthened liar problems and ap-
peal to inexpressibility. The meaning–inconsistency view affords a nice expla-
nation of how strengthened liar problems arise, and make such problems in
some ways less serious. Here is the basic idea.
If the mcs for the expressions of a given language cannot be jointly satis-
fied, then the semantic values of some expressions will be such that the mcs for
these expressions are not true. Say that the relevant expressions misfire. (Intu-
itively: the semantic values of these expressions aren’t what we intend them to
be.) It is then a consequence of my view on the liar that some expressions cen-
trally employed in the liar paradox will misfire. But if we keep in mind that the
liar paradox has the consequence that some expressions misfire, the strength-
ened liar problem is to be expected: any account which does relatively well
in assigning intuitively acceptable semantic values to some of the expressions
centrally employed in the liar reasoning will assign counterintuitive semantic
values to other expressions. That is what is shown by strengthened liar prob-
lems. (The dialetheist has the seeming advantage here that she can allow an
inconsistent assignment of semantic values. But not even the dialetheist can
respect all mcs, for she cannot respect what is meaning–constitutive for nega-
tion. This is the main point from  again.)
Compare perhaps vagueness, and the problem of higher–order vagueness.
I hold a view on vagueness and the sorites paradox like that I hold on the liar
paradox. Focus on vague predicates. I think that for F a vague predicate, a prin-
ciple of the following form—a tolerance principle—is meaning–constitutive for
F:
A small enough difference in F’s parameter of application never
matters to the applicability of F, while there is a difference in the
parameter of application that sometimes matters.8
As an example, consider ‘tall’. According to a plausible tolerance principle
for ‘tall’, a difference in height (the parameter of application in this case) of one
angstrom never matters while a difference in height of three inches sometimes
matters.
Consider now what is known as the problem of higher–order vagueness.
Take a sorites series for a vague predicate F: a series of objects 1, . . . , n such that
for each pair of adjacent objects, the objects in this pair differ only very slightly
in F’s parameter of application and such that F(1) is, intuitively, obviously true
and F(n) is, intuitively, obviously false. It is then counterintuitive that there
should be some objects i and i+ 1 such that F(i) is true and F(i+ 1) is false. In
response many theorists opt for deviant logic and semantics. Some theorists
of vagueness say that when object i is borderline F, F(i) is neither true nor
8 See my (2002a) and (2005) for more on vagueness. The notion of tolerance is from Wright
(1975).
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false. Other theorists of vagueness posit a continuum of truth–values between
1 (True) and 0 (False). Both types of accounts face a problem of higher–order
vagueness. Saying that F divides up objects 1, . . . , n into three classes—true,
false and in between—is really hardly more plausible than saying that F divides
them up into two classes (true and false).9
Now, the fact that the problem of higher–order vagueness is nicely ex-
plained by the view that vagueness is a matter of meaning–inconsistency. For it
is a consequence of the view that vagueness is a matter of meaning–
inconsistency that all assignments of semantic values to vague expressions will
be counterintuitive—for no assignment of semantic values makes true the tol-
erance principles which are mcs for vague expressions. There will always be a
bump in the carpet somewhere.
Suppose now that the diagnosis of strengthened liar problems afforded by
the meaning–inconsistency view is correct. Then strengthened liar problems
should in general seem less worrisome, and the dialetheist’s argument from the
strengthened liar should look less impressive. Go back to the list of alterna-
tives (a)–(c) above. I have already dismissed (a). Given the diagnosis of the
strengthened liar, we can say the following about (b) and (c). If expressions
can misfire in the way indicated, there are two questions one may ask about a
given property and given language L. (1) Is there in L an expression that actu-
ally expresses the property in question? (2) Is there in L an expression that, so
to speak, aims to express the property, in the sense that if it does not express
the property that is because it misfires? Let us say that if the answer to the
first question is affirmative, the property is expressible in L, and if the answer
to the second question is affirmative, the property is quasi–expressible in L.
Given the notion of quasi–expressibility, a theorist defending theory T can in-
sist that the relevant property still is quasi–expressible. She can say, in response
to a problem of the form (c), ‘I agree that it seems perfectly obvious that P is
expressible in our actual language. But I can account for this as follows. We
have an expression of our language which aims to express P—an expression of
our language which misfires if it doesn’t express P. On my view, however, this
expression misfires.’ And she can say in response to a problem of the form (b),
‘All that the strengthened liar shows is that one of the expressions that I use
in stating my solution misfires. Maybe the real lesson of the strengthened liar
is that misfiring is something we just have to learn to accept as a fact.’ (Of
course, some expressions used in these speeches will themselves misfire. But
that is part of the package.)
Needless to say, there is more to say about this response to strengthened
liar problems. What I want to emphasize here is just that the view on the
liar paradox that I am defending affords a new and promising way to look at
9There are of course responses to the problem of higher–order vagueness. One is to urge the
necessity of a vague metalanguage. Since I am bringing up vagueness only as an illustration, I
will not here discuss those responses.
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